Interstate Excavating, Inc v. Agla Development Corporation : Appellant\u27s Brief On Appeal by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Interstate Excavating, Inc v. Agla Development
Corporation : Appellant's Brief On Appeal
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.ROBERT M. McRAE; Attorney for AppellantE. H.
FANKHAUSER; Attorney for Respondent
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Interstate Excavating v. AGLA Dev., No. 16599 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1865
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTERSTATE EXCAVATING, INC., 
> • ~ •• --------------------------------------------------------"'."---7~~;ii\"· 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16599 
AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
--------------------------·-' 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
---------------------------· 
An appeal from a default juci~ elE .r 
the Third Judicial District c..a. i!IJ. .,··. : 
Salt Lake County, State of Ptllirw . ..... i~, .. , 








E. H. FANKHAUSER 
COTRO-MANES, WARR, FANKHAUSER 
& GREEN 
Judge Building, #430 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------------------------------------
INTERSTATE EXCAVATING, INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16599 
AG~A DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Ap~ellant. 
APPELLi\NT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
An appeal from a default judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
COTRO-MANES, WARR, FANKHAUSER 
& GREEN 
Judge Building, #430 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
McRAE & DeLAND 
72 East Fourth South, #355 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
AGRUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
CONCLUSION . . 
CASES CITED 
Board of Education of Granite School District v. 
Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (1963) 
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995 (1956) 
Culter v. Haycock, 90 P. 897 (1907) 
Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (1970) 
Heathman v. Fulran and Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 
( 1962) .... 
Hurd v. Ford, 276 P. 908 (1929) 
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951 
(1962) .... 
Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123 (1977) 
Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 
53 P. 1033 (1890) ... · · 
Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 




















Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 711 (1953) 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Larsen, 
544 p. 2d 876 (1975) •... 
STATUTES CITED 
Comp. Laws, 1876 § 1293 
Comp. Laws, 1917 § 6619 
Rev. Stat. 1898 § 3005 
104-14-4, Rev. Stat., 1933 
68-3-2, Utah Code Anno. (1953) 
104-14-4, Utah Code Anno. (1943) 
Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Restatement, Second, Judgments, Tentative Draft 
No . 6 , pg . 19 . . . . . . 















Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------------------------------------
INTERSTATE EXCAVATING, INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16599 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant, Agla Development Corporation, was 
sued by plaintiff-respondent, Interstate Excavating, Inc., for 
breach of contract and defendant counter claimed for breach of 
contract and slander of title. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Jay E. Banks rendered a default judgment 
in the amount of $46,101.70 and decree of foreclosure in favor of 
respondent and dismissed appellant's counterclaim with prejudice 
when appellant was not present at trial scheduled for May 7, 1979. 
Appellant's subsequent motion to have the default judgment set 
aside was denied by Judge Banks on June 18, 1979. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order 
denying the motion to set aside judgment and the right to have a 
trial upon the merits of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Since, the time of this writing, no transcript of the 
proceedings held on June 18, 1979 pursuant to appellant's motion 
to set aside judgment is available, appellant's statement of the 
facts and argument is based solely on the recond as manifested 
by the District Court file and pleadings. 
This controversy arises from two contracts entered be-
tween the parties whereby respondent contracted to provide water 
line and sewer improvements to two subdivisions owned by appellant. 
Subsequently, there arose several disagreements and difficulties 
between the parties which culminated in the filing of a suit by 
respondents, who alleged breach of contract. 
Appellant filed an Answer setting forth several affirma-
tive defenses and counterclaimed alleging a breach of contract and 
slander of title. On April 16, 1979, the matter came before the 
Honorable G. Hal Taylor for pre-trial settlement conference. At 
this time, appellant's counsel, Robert J. Haws, was given per-
mission to withdraw as counsel. That same day, counsel for 
respondent mailed a Notice to Appoint Counsel to appellant's office 
at 12655 South Redwood Road, Riverton, Utah. Said notice included 
the information that the case had been set for trial on May 7, 1979. 
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On May 7, 1979, appellant failed to appear through 
corporate officer or attorney and a judgment by default in the 
amount of $46,101.70 was entered infavor of respondent and 
appellant's counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice. Appellant, 
in the sworn statement accompanying his Motion to set aside 
specifically states that no notice of the trial date was received 
until a copy of the default judgment was received. 
Upon learning of the default judgment, appellant immedi-
ately contacted its present counsel, Robert M. McRae, to represent 
it in this matter. Pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, appellant filed a motion in the trial court to 
set aside the judgment on May 31, 1979. This motion was based on 
the sworn statement of Lafe Brown, President of the appellant, 
Agla Development Corporation, wherein he stated that appellant 
has no notice of the trial date, that the notice to appoint counsel 
was misplaced among numerous pleadings served on appellant's 
office by mail, that appellant's then counsel, Robert J. Haws, 
withdrew from a number of cases simultaneously, and that appellant 
was subtantially prejudiced in that a meritorious defense and 
counterclaim existed. 
This motion to set aside was heard by the trial court 
on June 18, 1979, and was denied on July 6, 1979. 
Notice of appeal was given by appellant on the 19th day 
of July, 1979. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment 
was made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which reads as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect .... The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), 
(3), or (4), not more than three months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken ..• " 
It is well settled that the rules of civil procedure are 
to be liberally construed with a view to promote justice. Rule 1, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 68-3-2, Utah Code Anno. (1953). 
In this regard, then Justice Crockett in Utah Sand & Gravel 
Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 402 P.2d 703 (1965) stated: 
"It is true that our new rules of civil procedure 
were intended to eliminate undue and emphasis on 
technicalities and to provide liberality in pro-
cedure to the end that disputes be heard and 
determined on the merits .••. Liberality in their 
interpretation and application should be indulged 
where no prejudice or disadvantage to anyone results ... " 
This statutory and judicial policy of liberality has been especially 
evident in those decisions in which the interpretation of Rule 60(b) 
has arisen in the context of a default judgment. From the earliest 
decisions of this Court, it has been emphasized that default 
-4-
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judgments are viewed with suspicion and that the authority of the 
trial court to set aside judgments obtained by default is to be 
liberally applied so that there might be a decision on the merits. 
Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P. 1033 (1890). 
This suspicion and disfavor arises from the recognition that it 
is a harsh and oppressive action to place a judgment rigidly and 
irrevocably on a party without a hearing and that it is fundamental 
to our system of justice that each party to a controversy by given 
an opportunity to present his side of the controversy. Mayhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951 (1962). Illustrative of the 
following language from Heathman v. Fulran and Clendenin, 377 P.2d 
189 (1962): 
"Judgments by default are not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of justice 
and fair play. No one has an inalienable or 
constitutional right to a judgment by default 
without a hearing on the merits. The courts, 
in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, 
where possible, a full and complete opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits of every case ... " 
Rule 60(b) and its statutory predecessorsl are of long 
standing and have been construed by this Court on numerous 
occasions. These decisions have uniformly embraced several general 
propositions, the first of which is that the trial court's deter-
mination involving a motion to set aside a default judgment is 
lcomp. Laws, 1876, § 1293; Rev. Stat. 1898, § 3005; 
comp. Laws, 1917, § 6619; 104-14-4 Rev. Stat., 1933; 104-14-4 
Utah Code Anno. 1943. 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
largely or discretionary matter, and as a concomitant, that this 
court will reverse such a determination only in the event of an 
abuse of that discretion. For example, see Board of Education of 
Granite School District v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (1963). Although 
it is true that no general rule can be promulgated respecting the 
exercise of discretion in setting aside or refusing to set aside 
a default judgment since each case must necessarily turn on its 
own peculiar facts and circumstances, Trumbo, supra, Heath v. 
Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (1979). This Court has, however, been careful 
to define the scope of that discretion, and has by no means given 
the trial courts a free hand to refuse to set aside default 
judgments. Thus, in Chrysler v. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995 (1956), 
then Justice Crockett, writing for a unamimous court stated: 
"We are entirely in accord with the authorities 
cited by plaintiff to the effect that it is 
generally regarded as an abuse of discretion for 
a trial court to refuse to vacate a default judg-
ment where timely application is made and there 
is any reasonable grounds for doing so, to the 
end that cases may be decided on their merits." 
This two pronged requirement of timeliness and reasonable justi-
fication has been subsequently cited with approval in many de-
cisions. Mayhew, supra; Board of Education, supra; Westinghouse 
Electirc Supply Co. v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876 (1975); and Olsen v. 
Cununings, 565 P.2d 1123 (1977). 
An examination of the factual setting reveals that 
appellant did in fact satisfy both of the requirements cited above, 
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that is, that the motion to set aside was both timely filed and 
based on reasonable grounds. As such, the trial court's refusal 
to set aside the default judgment constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 
That the motion was timely is clear. Rule 60(b) im-
poses a three month time limitation when the motion to set aside 
is neglect. As soon as appellant became aware of the entering 
of the default judgment through service by mail of the Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure dated May 14, 1979, he immediately 
contacted present counsel who prepared a Motion to Vacate Judgment 
on May 18, 1979 (only four days after the notice of judgment was 
placed in the mail), which motion was filed May 31, 1979 (seventeen 
days after mailing of notice of judgment) . This motion was not 
noticed up for hearing until June 18, 1979 due to t~e illness of 
the trial court, a fact which is not brought out in the record, 
but which can be verified. In any event, appellant acted with 
dispatch and well within the three month framework provided by 
Rule 60(b). 
Furthermore, appellant provided reasonable grounds for 
the failure to be present on the trial date, which grounds con-
stitute excusable neglect. Appellant never received notice in-
forming of the date that had been set for trial. Appellant's 
conduct prior to and subsequent to the default militates against 
any other conclusion. Appellant, upon the service of the Complaint 
which initiated this action, promptly answered interposing several 
-7-
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mertorious defenses and also filed a counterclaim. Once again, 
upon learning of the default judgment, appellant moved with dis-
patch in seeking to have the judgment set aside. Never has 
appellant manifested an intention to abandon this action. To 
the contrary, appellant has shown the diligence of one who is 
being sued for a substantial amount of money in damages (over 
$46,000) and who is counterclaiming for damages in excess of 
$150.000. The showing made by appellant is sufficient to require 
the exercise of discretion in its behalf to set aside the default 
judgment. 
It is apparent that in exercising its discretion to 
set aside a default judgment the trial court is engaged in a 
balancing process between two valid considerations. Warren v. 
Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 711 (1953). In that case this Court 
stated: 
"A rule which would permit the re-opening 
of cases previously decided because of error 
or ignorance during the progress of the trial 
would in large measure vitiate the effects of 
res judicata and create a hardship to the 
successful litigant in causing him to prose-
cute his action more than once and possibly 
lose the ability to collect his judgment; 
on the other hand, the court is anxious to 
protect the losing party who has not had the 
opportunity to present his claim or defense." 
Thus, the court, in exercising its discretion to refuse to set 
aside a default judgment must weigh between the advantage of 
enforcing the effect of res judicata and the disadvantage of not 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conducting a hearing on the merits. While a contested action 
yields a judgment wherein the value of res judicata is greatest, 
a default judgment followed by a delayed appearance, as in the 
instant case, carries with it a very low value of finality, that 
is, 
"There has been no examination of the merits 
or, usually, matters of abatement such as the 
statute of limitations, and no substantial in-
vestment of judicial time and authority. At 
the same time, the appearance itself, even 
though delayed, indicates that the defaulting 
party wishes to contest the justness of the 
plaintiff's claim. Indeed, the only purpose 
the default has served is that of enforcing 
the rules concerning time appearance." 
Restatement, Second, Judgments, Tentative Draft No. 6, pg. 19. 
It appears that the concerns manifested by this Court 
in Warren, supra, with respect to vacating judgments are out-
weighed by the benefits that would be bestowed by a hearing on 
the merits in the instant case. That is, the value of res 
judicata is low since there has been a minimal investment of 
judicial time and authority and since respondent would not be 
substantially prejudiced by a setting aside of the default and 
a re-hearing on the merits. Respondent will not be prejudiced 
in his ability to collect the judgment and any costs and attorney 
fees incurred by respondent in taking the default judgment can 
be made a condition precedent to the setting aside of the judgment. 
Thus, respondent would in no way be prejudiced by a setting aside 
of the default judgment. Furthermore, it is well established that 
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in all doubtful cases, the court should resolve any doubt in the 
balancing process towards granting relief from the default so as 
to bring about a trial on the merits. Cutler v. Haycock, 90 P. 
897 (1907), Hurd v. Ford, 276 P. 908 (1929), Trumbo, supra. 
Additionally, the Court in Culter made the point that when a 
difference of opinion exists between the trial court and the 
appellate court as to whether a reasonable basis exists for setting 
aside the default judgment, then the judgment shall be set aside: 
" ... While as we have already stated, the mere 
difference of judgment between this court and 
the trial court may not be conclusive, still 
it raises a serious doubt, and in such a case 
a reasonable doubts is always resolved in favor 
of granting a trial upon the merits where none 
was had ... " 
It should not be forgotten that the allowance of a 
vacation of judgment is a creative of equity and the equity takes 
into consideration factors which may be irrelevant in actions at 
law, such as the unfairness of a party's conduct, his delay in 
bringing or continuing the action and the hardship in granting 
or denying relief. Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 260 P.2d 741 (1959). 
Similarly, Professor Moore cites the following factors as being 
relevant to the exercising of discretion: 
1) the general desirability that a final judgment 
should not be lightly disturbed; 
2) the Rule should be liberally construed for the 
purpose of doing substantial justice; 
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3) whether, although the motion is made within the 
maximum time provided by the Rule, the motion is made within a 
reasonable time; 
4) if the relief is sought from a default judgment, 
whether in the particular case the interest of deciding cases or 
the merits outweighs the interest in orderly procedure and in the 
finality of judgments; 
5) whether there is merit in the defense or claim; 
and 
6) whether there are any intervening equities which 
make it inequitable to grant relief. 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 
§ 60.19. 
With reagrd to these above cited factors, the above 
statement can be made concerning the instant case: 
1) The motion was made with dispatch and in a reason-
able time (17 days) well within the three month limitation imposed 
by Rule 60(b); 
2) Appellant has meritorious defenses and a meritorious 
counterclaim involving substantial sums of money which will cause 
appellant severe economic hardship if the motion is not granted; 
3) No prejudice will result to respondent if a trial 
on the merits is ordered since respondent will have no greater 
difficulty enforcing a subsequent judgment and the reimbursement 
of any costs or attorney's fees incurred by respondent in obtaining 
the judgment can be made a condition precedent to the setting aside 
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of the default; 
4) The value of the trial judgment is minimal in the 
default situation since little judicial energy was exhausted in 
entering the default; and 
5) Justice requires the Rule to be liberally construed 
and any doubt should be resolved in favor of setting aside the 
default. 
CONCLUSION 
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases with 
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition 
in order to keep them up to date. But it is 
even more important to keep in mind that the 
very reason for the existence of courts is to 
afford disputants an opportunity to be heard 
and to do justice between them." 
Westinghouse Electice Supply v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876 (1975). 
The refusal of the lower court to set aside the default 
judgment constituted an abuse of discretion. Appellant did timely 
file his motion to set aside supported by reasonable grounds. 
Disputed issues should be disposed of on substantive, rather 
than technical grounds in the interest of justice and fair play. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of October, 1979. 
/ 
Robert M. McRae 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
72 East Fourth South, #355 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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MAILED OR DEVLIERED personally a copy of the foregoing 
to E. H. Fankhauser of Cotro-Manes, Warr, Fankhauser & Green, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, Judge Building, #430, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111, this 26th day of October, 1979 • 
. ~----,--/. ,/. - ~ 
( l 1,L ;"._' '-. (" 
Robert M. McRae 
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